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RICO AND "PATTERN:" THE SEARCH FOR
"CONTINUITY PLUS RELATIONSHIP"
Michael Goldsmith t
In ordinary usage, the term pattern often means "a series of
events [with] an arrangement of parts, elements, or details that sug-
gest a design or orderly distribution."' Though easily understood
in most contexts, the meaning of pattern is currently the most con-
troversial interpretative issue arising under the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law ("RICO").2 The defini-
tion of pattern is critical to RICO because almost everything out-
lawed by the law requires proof of a "pattern of racketeering
activity." 3 Moreover, in addition to defining criminal activity, the
t Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. B.A. 1972,J.D. 1975, Cornell Uni-
versity. The author, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney and Counsel to the New York
State Organized Crime Task Force, has testified on RICO reform before the U.S. Con-
gress and is currently Vice-Chairman of the RICO Cases Committee, Criminal Justice
Section of the American Bar Association.
The author wishes to thank Constance Healey, Austen Henry, Gary Hill, Karen
Newmeyer, and Rose S. Wilson for their assistance on this project.
1 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1794 (2d
ed. 1943), quoted in Brief for Respondent at 16, H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
(on writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit), cert.
granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3632, 3647 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1988) (No. 87-1252) [hereinafter Re-
spondent's Brief]. Respondent's Brief also cites dictionary definitions of pattern that
include, among others, "a combination of... acts.., forming a consistent or character-
istic arrangement" and a "frequent or widespread incidence." Id. at 15. Because this
article ultimately attacks the position taken by respondent in H.. Inc., it is useful to
begin our analysis at the same starting point. Accordingly, I rely upon the definitions
proffered by respondent. At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that
the word pattern, as with many words in our language, has a variety of meanings. See,
e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNA-
BRIDGED 1657 (1986) (16 different meanings); 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 565-
66 (1933 & 1982 Supp.) (13 meanings). Therefore, the "ordinary" meaning of pattern
may be multifaceted and very much dependent upon the context within which the term
is being used. See infra notes 93, 163 & 165 and accompanying text. See also Holmes, The
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv. 417 (1898-99) ("It is not true that in prac-
tice (and I know no reason why theory should disagree with facts) a given word or even a
given collocation of words has one meaning and no other. A word generally has several
meanings, even in the dictionary. You have to consider the sentence in which it stands
to decide which of those meanings it becomes in the particular case ... ").
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1984 & Supp. 1988). See Note, Claifying a Pattern of Confu-
sion: A Multifactor Approach to Civil RICO's Pattern Requirement, 86 MicH. L. REv. 1745,
1748 (1988) [hereinafter Pattern of Confusion]; Note, The Pattern Requirement in Civil RICO is
Working: Case Law After Sedima, 33 VILL. L. Rv. 205, 209 (1988) [hereinafter The Pattern
Requirement is Working] (noting extensive split of authority).
3 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
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concept governs the availability of civil relief, and affects a variety of
criminal and civil procedural issues. 4
The controversy surrounding this element stems from two fac-
tors. First, RICO does not define "pattern of racketeering activity."
Instead, the law states that such a pattern "requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity" within ten years of each other.5 Second, in a
1985 decision entitled Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,6 the Supreme
Court suggested that RICO's "extraordinary" breadth stems from
the judiciary's failure to interpret the pattern element meaningfully
and not simply from statutory design.7 Accordingly, in what has be-
come a landmark footnote, Justice White's majority opinion ad-
vanced the following suggestion:
The legislative history supports the view that two isolated acts
of racketeering do not constitute a pattern. As the Senate Report
explained: "The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity.
The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more
than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activ-
ity to be effective. It is this factor of 'continuity plus relationship'
which combines to produce a pattern."
After Sedima, pattern became the most frequently litigated issue
under RICO. 9 Though the concept of "continuity plus relation-
ship" clarified and narrowed the pattern element, courts have not
achieved consensus.' 0 Thus, the Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. " to clarify the
matter. At issue in H.J. Inc. is the propriety of an Eighth Circuit rule
that a pattern must consist of multiple schemes. 12 By shifting the
focus of inquiry from "continuity plus relationship"1 3 to an arbitrary
4 See infra notes 39-45 & 59-79 (pattern in criminal and civil cases); Brief of Amici
Curiae Attorney General Robert K. Corbin of Arizona et al., at 9. Pattern may, for exam-
ple, affect the availability of collateral estoppel, Lewisville Properties Inc. v. Gray, 819
F.2d 946, 950 (5th Cir. 1988), and the application of the limitations period, United
States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 713-15 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 1995 (1988).
See also Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology
Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 526, 536 (1987).
5 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1984) (emphasis added). The absence of an express defini-
tion reflects a conscious legislative choice. See infra notes 30 & 182 and accompanying
text.
6 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
7 Id. at 500.
8 Id. at 496 n.14 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969)) (em-
phasis added).
9 See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 4, at 620.
10 See infra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
11 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3632, 3647 (U.S. Mar. 22,
1988) (No. 87-1252).
12 Id. at 650; see infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
13 H.J. Inc., 829 F.2d at 650 ("We have followed the Sedima Court's intimations and
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counting of schemes, the Eighth Circuit test presents the most re-
strictive interpretation of pattern to emerge. Under its guise, the
scope of RICO has been unduly curtailed.
The potential significance of H.J. Inc., however, transcends
Eighth Circuit doctrine. Because other circuits have likewise failed
to resolve the pattern question, the situation demands more defini-
tive direction from the Supreme Court. Such direction, however,
may prove problematic because RICO is under ideological attack.
White collar institutions view the grant of certiorari as an opportunity
to resurrect previously rejected doctrine limiting RICO to tradi-
tional organized crime.14 Various amid representing white collar in-
terests have filed briefs arguing that pattern must be interpreted in
light of a supposed congressional intent to limit RICO to organized
crime.' 5 Given this asserted intent, amid claim that pattern must be
restricted to reach only those persons habitually or regularly en-
gaged in organized criminal activity. 16 These arguments, though al-
luring, are inconsistent with RICO's text, legislative history, and
purposes.
This Article proposes an "ordinary meaning" approach to pat-
tern closely tied to RICO's text and consistent with other federal
jurisprudence employing similar terminology. This reading of the
pattern element may appropriately curtail RICO's "extraordinary"
breadth without impeding RICO's goal of attacking enterprise crim-
inality in all forms. The Article consists of five parts. Part I reviews
the nature and structure of RICO. Part II sets forth the historical
context of the present debate. Part III examines Sedima's aftermath
and criticizes the multiple scheme test. Part IV considers the organ-
ized crime oriented pattern limitation proposed by amid in H.J. Inc.
Finally, Part V provides a framework for resolution of the pattern
issue.
I
THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF RICO
RICO comprises Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
have required the combination of continuity plus relationship to establish the necessary
pattern.") (citation omitted).
14 See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
15 See Brief for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Cu-
riae in Support of Respondents at 3 [hereinafter AICPA Brief]; Brief for the AFL-CIO as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3-4 [hereinafter AFL-CIO Brief]; Brief for the
National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3
[hereinafter NAM Brief]; Brief for The Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Re-
spondents as Amid Curiae at 3 [hereinafter WLF Brief]. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce
also filed a supporting brief, but advanced a less drastic position. Brief for the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America as Amid Curiae at 6.
16 See supra note 15; see also infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
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of 1970.17 Title IX embodies a new approach to law enforcement:
the creation of substantive legislation designed to attack "enterprise
criminality." 18 Both the common law and traditional criminal legis-
lation concentrated on convicting individual offenders. However,
by 1970, numerous studies had established that such prosecutions
were ineffectual in combating systemic criminality. 19 Though indi-
vidual prosecutions often succeeded, enterprises fostering illicit ac-
tivity usually survived. This problem was especially pronounced in
the area of organized crime, whose diversified activities pervade
American society. 20
Accordingly, Congress directed RICO against enterprises en-
gaged in systemic crime. Individual offenders still face prosecution
under RICO, but they are charged with committing crimes whose
seriousness is enhanced by virtue of defined relationships to an en-
terprise. RICO section 1962 contains four prohibitions that to-
gether address each mode in which an enterprise may be used to
promote systemic crime: (1) section 1962(a) makes it unlawful for
anyone who has received income from a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity to invest the proceeds of such activity in an enterprise; (2) sec-
tion 1962(b) prohibits anyone from acquiring or maintaining an
interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity;
(3) section 1962(c) makes it illegal for anyone associated with an
enterprise to conduct its affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity; and (4) section 1962(d) outlaws conspiring to violate any of
the preceding provisions. 2 1 Offenders potentially face enhanced
criminal penalties and civil sanctions that include treble damages,
17 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
18 Professor G. Robert Blakey, widely recognized as the principal draftsman of
RICO, states that the law sought "to provide new legal remedies for all types of organ-
ized criminal behavior, that is, enterprise criminaliy-from simple political corruption to
sophisticated white-collar crime schemes to traditional Mafia-type endeavors." Blakey &
Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and
Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1013-14 (1980)) (emphasis added); see also Gold-
smith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
774, 774-76 (1988) (quoting case law).
19 See Goldsmith, supra note 18, at 774, 780-84.
20 Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922 (1970) ("[Olrganized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversi-
fied, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption."). A
title and declaration of policy are important aids in construing legislation. Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154 (1921) ("entitled at least to great respect"). Nevertheless, a
restrictive preamble may not be used to limit a clear text. United States v. Briggs, 50
U.S. (9 How.) 353, 355 (1850); Roush v. State, 413 So. 2d 15, 18-19 (Fla. 1982).
21 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). Each of these provisions may also be violated through
activity involving "the collection of an unlawful debt." The unlawful debt provision of
RICO does not require proof of a pattern of racketeering activity. United States v. Angi-
ulo, 847 F.2d 956, 964 (1st Cir. 1988). See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 4, at 529 ("by,
through, or against an enterprise").
RICO AND "PATTERN"
attorney's fees, and injunctive restraints. 22 Furthermore, Congress
directed the courts to construe RICO liberally to effectuate the stat-
utory goal of ridding society of enterprise criminality. 23
Two concepts recur as elements of each prohibition imposed by
RICO: "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering activity." Both of
these concepts reflect the intent that RICO's enhanced penalty
structure apply only to those who engage in a course of criminal
activity of an organized nature.24 Significantly, however, RICO does
not limit the enterprise element to illicit groups such as organized
crime families. Instead, the law suggests that an enterprise may in-
clude both licit and illicit organizations. 25 Similarly, RICO does not
limit "racketeering activity" to violent offenses popularly associated
with organized crime. Racketeering activity is explicitly defined to
include various types of frauds and other misconduct often commit-
ted by white collar criminals.26 RICO, however, requires more than
use or involvement of an enterprise in racketeering activity. The law
also requires a "pattern of racketeering activity." 27 Thus, the debate
over pattern concerns a statutory element that is crucial to RICO's
entire matrix.
Ironically, Congress consciously chose not to define "pattern of
racketeering activity." Whereas Congress explicitly defined RICO's
other statutory elements, 28 it merely limited pattern by a minimum
requirement of two racketeering predicates committed within ten
years of each other.29 By limiting pattern rather than defining it,
Congress provided flexibility sufficient to accommodate a variety of
22 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-64 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
23 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note (1982); see generally Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction
Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1980). The significance of this directive is examined
infra notes 88 & 164.
24 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1969, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
158 (1969) ("threat of continuing activity") [hereinafter Senate OCCA Report]; 116
CONG. REc. 585, 591 (1970) (statement of Senator McClellan) (criminal organizations
pose continuing threat); A. MATHEWS, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE
OF THE ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING, AND BUSINESS LAW 71-72 (1985) [here-
inafter CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE].
25 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1984)
provides that "'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity."
26 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1984). Predicates designated as racketeering activity may
be categorized as crimes of"(1) violence; (2) provision of illegal goods and services; (3)
corruption in the labor movement or among public officials; and (4) commercial and
other forms of fraud." Blakey, The Civil RICO Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Ben-
nett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 300-06 (1982).
27 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying note 21.
28 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), (2), (6)-(8) (1982) (defining various terms including
"racketeering activity," "state," and "enterprise").
29 See supra note 5.
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situations involving a course of criminal conduct.30 Though the ab-
sence of a precise definition is now critical, the pattern controversy
is actually part of a much larger debate over the propriety of RICO
itself. The context of that debate must be understood before the
pattern issue can be resolved.
II
THE CONTEXT OF DEBATE
RICO has inspired controversy from its inception. The original
debates surrounding this law addressed a concern that survives to
this day: the question of statutory breadth. Legislators opposed to
RICO argued that the statute's reach inappropriately extended be-
yond traditional organized crime. 31 RICO sponsors, however, re-
sponded that the law would be objectionable if limited to a certain
type of defendant.32 Moreover, though traditional organized crime
provided the initial catalyst for the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, including RICO, its sponsors stressed the need to craft a stat-
ute capable of reaching other forms of crime as well. 33 These views
30 See 116 CONG. REC. 35,302 (1970) (statement of Representative Cellar); see also
infra notes 73 & 93, 163 and accompanying text; cf Senate OCCA Report, supra note 24,
at 165 (stating that the "variety of... relationships precludes more detailed specifica-
tion" of pattern in Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act); infra note 181 and
accompanying text.
31 Blakey, supra note 26, at 264 n.78, 268-79 (containing a detailed review of these
criticisms). The Supreme Court considered it significant that, notwithstanding such crit-
icism, Congress enacted RICO with white collar crimes as predicate offenses. Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1985).
32 For example, Representative Poff, who co-sponsored RICO, observed:
The gentleman inquired rhetorically as to why no effort was made to
define organized crime in this bill. It is true that there is no organized
crime definition in many parts of the bill. This is, in part, because it is
probably impossible precisely and definitively to define organized crime.
But if it were possible, I ask my friend, would he not be the first to object
that in criminal law we establish procedures which vould be applicable
only to a certain type of defendant? Would he not be the first to object to
such a system?
116 CONG. REC. 35,204 (1970). See generally Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 685-88 (1987) (arguing that Congress intended to address or-
ganized crime but had difficulties defining this concept).
33 Senator McClellan, the Organized Crime Control Act's principal sponsor, re-
sponded to criticism that the Act was not limited to organized crime as follows:
The danger posed by organized crime-type offenses.., has provided
the occasion for our examination of the working of our system of criminal
justice. But should it follow.., that any proposals for action stemming
from that examination be limited to organized crime?
... [This] confuses the occasion for reexamining an aspect of our
system ... with the proper scope of any new principle or lesson derived
from that reexamination.... Is there any good reason why we should not
move ... across the board?
. [The objection [also] confuses the role of the Congress with the
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ultimately prevailed, as both houses of Congress enacted RICO by
substantial majorities.3 4
Since its enactment, however, RICO has survived a series of at-
tempts to curb its broad language. Criminal defendants made the
first efforts to restrict RICO's reach. Because the statute gave pros-
ecutors unprecedented powers,3 5 defendants struggled to avoid its
scope. In the scramble that ensued, defense counsel sometimes- ad-
vanced conflicting arguments. For example, white collar defendants
argued that RICO reached only traditional organized crime,3 6 while
some organized crime defendants maintained that RICO applied
only to legitimate businesses.3 7 Both arguments failed because
neither the enterprise element nor the statutory definition of "per-
son" contains such exclusions.38
Criminal defendants also sought to confine the pattern element
narrowly. Here, too, they advanced somewhat contradictory argu-
role of a court. Out of a proper sense of their limited lawmaking func-
tion, courts ought to confine their judgments to the facts of the case
before them. But the Congress in fulfilling its proper legislative role
must examine not only individual instances, but whole problems.... [I]t
has a duty not to engage in piecemeal legislation. Whatever the limited
occasion for the identification of a problem, the Congress has the duty of
enacting a principled solution to the entire problem.
116 CONG. REc. 18,913-14 (1970). Congressman Poff made a similar statement before
the House of Representatives. Id. at 35,344. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
34 The Senate initially approved S.30, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, by
a vote of 73 to 1. 116 CONG. REc. 972 (1970). The House of Representatives approved
the bill by a vote of 341 to 26. Id. at 35,363. The Senate gave it final approval by voice
vote. Id. at 36,296.
35 See generally Lynch, supra note 32, at 661-63, 928-32 (citing other authority); Tar-
low, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. Rav. 165, 170
(1980) (reviewing prosecutorial advantages).
36 Tarlow, supra note 35, at 205-06 n.218 (citing cases in which the issue was raised
by defendants who argued that governmental entities may not be RICO enterprises).
37 See id at 191-92; United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 579-80 (1981) (re-
jecting the argument that RICO applies only to legitimate businesses).
38 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982) provides that" 'person' includes any individual or en-
tity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property" (emphasis added). Simi-
larly, RICO's criminal penalties apply to "[wihoever violates any provision of section
1962 . .. " 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1984 & 1988 Supp.) (emphasis added). The term "who-
ever" is defined to "include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, joint stock companies, as well as individuals." 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Thus,
neither of these definitions is limited to individuals or to organized crime. See United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81, 585 (1981) (rejecting legitimate business limi-
tation); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
946 (1980) (rejecting organized crime limitation); see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note
18, at 1023-24 nn.85-87 (extensive list of cases). Because other titles of the Organized
Crime Control Act are expressly limited to organized crime, see infra note 117 and ac-
companying text, the absence of such a limitation in RICO reflects a conscious legisla-
tive choice. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d at 303-04; see also infra note 52 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, in other contexts, courts have declined to impose an
organized crime limitation because of definitional difficulties attendant to this concept.
See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
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ments. Because prosecutors began using RICO to avoid procedural
rules precluding joinder of multiple defendants and diverse crimes
in a single trial,39 defendants argued that pattern requires the racke-
teering acts to be connected to each other through some common
scheme or plan. 40 Ironically, this argument almost amounts to a
claim that only a single scheme may qualify as a pattern under
RICO.4 1 Ultimately, courts found that a pattern might be estab-
lished by showing a common scheme,42 but held that pattern does
not require such proof.43 Accordingly, defendants then argued that
pattern requires proof of multiple schemes or episodes. This argu-
ment also failed. Though a few courts agreed that a single criminal
episode-involving the commission of several crimes-ought not be
a basis for pattern,44 judges felt bound by the mistaken belief that
two predicates within ten years automatically constitute a pattern of
racketeering activity. 45
Attempts to restrict the scope of RICO's sanctions also failed.46
39 See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 417-18 (1983); Lynch, supra note
32, at 928-32.
40 See, e.g., Tarlow, supra note 35, at 219; United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118,
1121-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
41 Under this approach, a single scheme is often a prerequisite to pattern because
the presence of disparate crimes may negate the common scheme. See Tarlow, supra
note 35, at 216.
42 See, e.g., United States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606, 612 (2d Cir. 1986).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 871 (1980). Indeed, prior to 1985, the uniform holding was that "two acts," not
"two schemes," were all that was required to establish a "pattern." See, e.g., United
States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1389 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981);
United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
44 See United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57-58 (D. Conn. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977); cf Exeter Towers Assocs. v. Bowditch, 604 F. Supp. 1547, 1554
(D. Mass. 1985) (pattern of racketeering activity not satisfied by proof that in purchasing
a single mortgage, defendants committed two or more predicate acts of mail fraud);
Telepromter of Erie, Inc. v. Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6, 12-13 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (pattern of
racketeering activity not satisfied by proof of numerous bribes to one official by defend-
ant's employees at the same fundraiser).
45 See Note, The Pattern Element of RICO Before and After Sedima: A Look at Both Federal
and Florida RICO, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 321, 327 (1987) [hereinafter Federal and Florida
RICO]; Note, Reconsideration of Pattern in Civil RICO Offenses, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 83,
86-87 (1986) (citing cases) [hereinafter Reconsideration of Pattern]. Judge Newman in
United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57-58 (D. Conn. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977), felt bound by United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). Normally a carefuljurist, Judge Newman failed
to recognize that Moeller involved "pattern" in section 1962(c), while Parness involved
"pattern" in section 1962(b). As such, differing constructions of the term might well
have been proper in the two differing contexts. See infra notes 73 & 93.
46 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20-22 (1983) (forfeiture provision ex-
tends to racketeering proceeds).
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The judiciary recognized that RICO's reach was broad.47 However,
given the evils of organized crime, courts declined to curtail the stat-
ute.48 Judicial attitudes changed only when civil RICO came into
vogue. At first, the private bar failed to recognize the enormous
potential of civil RICO.49 When such litigation commenced in the
early 1980's, however, RICO plaintiffs immediately encountered ju-
dicial hostility. Though RICO's prohibitions do not distinguish be-
tween criminal and civil litigation, many judges viewed the
application of civil RICO to white collar institutions as an anti-Mafia
law run amuck.50
Consequently, courts imposed a series of "organized crime"
type limitations on civil RICO which differed from one another in
style but not in effect. Initially, a few courts expressly ruled that civil
RICO applies only to defendants engaged in traditional organized
crime activity. 51 Though courts later rejected this preclusion as un-
supported by the statute's text or legislative history,52 many judges
indirectly imposed a similar limitation by requiring proof of a "com-
petitive" or "racketeering" injury. 53 Another judicial limitation,
adopted by the Second Circuit, threatened to gut civil RICO by re-
quiring a criminal conviction as a prerequisite to relief.54 In Sedima
47 See id. at 21-22; United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87, 593 (1981); see
also Lynch, supra note 32, at 694-97.
48 See Russello, 464 U.S. at 26-28; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588-90.
49 See CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 55 (noting only nine civil RICO
cases reported before 1980 and substantial increase beginning in 1983).
50 See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 529-30 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); In re Dow Co. "Sarabond" Products Liability Litigation, 666 F. Supp. 1466,
1470-71 (D. Colo. 1987) (Kane, J.).
51 See Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299, 1308 (D. Colo. 1984) (Kane, J.) ("It
was, however, the declared purpose of Congress to 'seek *the eradication of organized
crime in the United States.' "); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F.
Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
52 See, e.g., Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 782 F.2d 883, 887 (10th Cir. 1986); Owl
Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir.) ("[C]ourts
and ... commentators have persuasively and exhaustively explained why.. . RICO...
[is not limited] to organized crime .. "), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); see also supra
note 38.
53 See, e.g., Van Schaickv. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D. Mass.
1982); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
Ironically, the courts failed to define these terms with precision, See Sedima, 473 U.S. at
494 ("hampered by the vagueness of that concept"). The Second Circuit, however, de-
fined racketeering injury as " 'an injury different in kind from that occurring as a result
of the predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate acts, but also
caused by an injury which RICO was designed to deter.' " Id. at 485. Competitive injury
"seems to refer to any kind of injury resulting from the competitive advantage gained by
the RICO violator through resort to illegal business tactics." Note, Civil RICO: The
Temptation and Impropriety ofJudicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1110 n.49 (1982).
54 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S.
479 (1985); see also Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis For Compromise, 71 MINN. L.
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the Supreme Court ultimately rejected these judicial attempts to re-
write RICO.55 The Supreme Court's decision, however, set in mo-
tion two streams of activity. First, because Justice White's majority
opinion suggested that only congressional reform could moderate
RICO's breadth,5 6 lobbyists initiated a massive campaign to achieve
this end.57 Second, because Justice White suggested that "pattern"
might offer a way to curtail RICO's breadth, the judiciary immedi-
ately concentrated on narrowing this element. Though Congress
has not narrowed the pattern element,58 judicial action has often
achieved this result.
III
SEDIMA'S AFTERMATH
Since Sedima, most courts have narrowed the pattern element
substantially. 59 Nevertheless, judicial efforts have failed to achieve
either clarity or consistency. Because the cases are in disarray, it is
REV. 827, 849-52 (1987) (discussing effect of prior conviction requirement); Note, Civil
RICO: Prior Criminal Conviction and Burden of Proof, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 566, 572
(1985).
55 473 U.S. at 481, 493. The judicially imposed limitations would have rewritten
civil RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), as follows: "Any person competitively injured by organized
crime in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter
may sue therefore any person convicted of a violation of section 1962 or racketeering activity in
any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustainsfor any injury distinct from said racketeering activity and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee." The Supreme Court has responded aptly and bluntly to
judicial efforts of this kind: "The short answer is that Congress did not write the statute
that way." Russello v. United States, 469 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773 (1979)).
56 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
57 See Goldsmith, supra note 54, at 829-30, 848-55; see also Note, Congress Responds to
Sedima: Is There a Contract Out on Civil RICO?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 851, 868-69, 871-74
(1986).
58 Thus far, Congress has not amended the pattern element. See Pattern of Confusion,
supra note 2, at 1784-85 (present reform proposals do not address this issue).
59 See infra notes 63-79 and accompanying text. In fact, in their enthusiasm to cur-
tail the scope of civil RICO many federal courts have improperly applied restrictive fed-
eral jurisprudence to certain state RICO statutes that expressly define pattern, using
different terminology than the federal statute. See Behunin v. Dow Chem. Co., 650 F.
Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Colo. 1986) (Kane, J.); Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 645 F.
Supp. 423, 426 (D. Utah 1986). For example, state RICO laws often differ from their
federal counterpart by using terms such as "incidents," or "events" in their definition of
"pattern." See, e.g. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 772.02 (1986) (incidents); State v. Russo, 493 So. 2d
504, 505 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 1986) (noting "incidents" under state statute rather than
"acts"). See also State v. Fletcher, 751 P.2d 805, 816 n.5 (Utah App. 1988) (pattern
under state law "does not operate from the same sparse language of the RICO Act.").
Federal courts that impose interpretations of federal RICO on state statutes brazenly
ignore statutory text to the contrary. See Brief of Amici Curiae Attorney General Robert
K. Corbin of Arizona et al., at 2 n.4, 17 n.29, for a detailed discussion of the improper
activities of district courts in Colorado to restrict Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-103 (Supp.
1984).
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difficult even to categorize the different jurisprudential views. Vari-
ous wrinkles, which have modified the prevailing tests, and the
presence of contradictory opinions within several circuits compli-
cate this task.60 Notwithstanding this "bedlam," 6 1 the pattern cases
generally conform to one of four positions. 62
First, the least restrictive view of pattern rejects Sedima's foot-
note analysis as mere dictum, and holds that two related racketeer-
ing acts, within ten years, satisfy the pattern requirement. 63 This
position, however, effectively nullifies the pattern element in com-
mercial fraud cases. Under federal jurisprudence, each mailing or
interstate wire communication made in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud constitutes a separate violation of the mail or wire fraud
statutes.64 As virtually every major commercial transaction gener-
ates at least two mailings or interstate telephone calls,65 the predi-
cates required for a pattern are too readily available. Congress'
clear intent to make the pattern element a meaningful requirement
indicates the error of this analysis. 66
The second view of pattern focuses expressly on the concept of
"continuity plus relationship." 67 Some courts simply hold that pat-
60 See infra notes 63, 67-69, 71 & 79 and accompanying text.
61 See Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898, 910 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pratt, J., dissenting)
(discussing bedlam within Second Circuit); see also Beauford v. Helmsley, 843 F.2d 103,
109 (2d Cir. 1988); Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660
F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (D. Conn. 1987); Chronister v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 653 F. Supp.
1576, 1582 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Penterelli v. Spector Cohen Gadon & Rosen, 640 F. Supp.
868, 873 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
62 See Pattern of Confusion, supra note 2, at 1754 (presenting three differing views);
The Pattern Requirement is Working, supra note 2, at 214-15 (four views).
63 See United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 56
U.S.L.W. 3853 (1987); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir.
1985). Both opinions have been criticized. In Hyatt, a 5th Circuit panel disputed its
validity but felt bound by precedent. Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d
423, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1987). A Second Circuit panel questioned lanniello's continued
validity in Beauford v. Helmsley, 843 F.2d 103, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1988), reh'g en banc
pending.
64 Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DuQ. L. REv. 771, 777-78 (1980)
(citing case law); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
65 See, e.g., Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1987) (transac-
tions rarely do not involve use of the mails).
66 For example, Congress stressed that pattern is "essential to the operation of the
statute." Senate OCCA Report, supra note 24, at 157; see also Note, The Pattern Require-
ment of Civil RICO, 74 Ky. LJ. 623, 628-31 (1986) (reviewing legislative history). In ef-
fect, the least restrictive view of pattern provides no protection against an unduly broad
application of the statute. Consequently, RICO may improperly encumber ordinary dis-
putes in areas as diverse as trusts and estates, domestic relations, and patent litigation.
Because Congress did not intend this result, such use of RICO has sparked criticism.
Note, supra note 57, at 856-59 (summary of criticism). Because ordinary disputes in
these areas do not involve a threat of continuity, they do not constitute a pattern of
racketeering activity.
67 See supra text accompanying note 8.
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tern is determined by the presence of this concept. 68 Others have
refined this approach by proposing various factors to apply in deter-
mining whether "continuity plus relationship" exists. These factors
include: 1) the number and variety of predicate acts; 2) the duration
of criminal activity; 3) the number of victims; 4) the existence of
multiple schemes; and 5) the infliction of distinct injuries. 69 This
approach to pattern requires careful consideration of the facts of
each case. Though somewhat lacking in predictability, the standard
has often achieved appropriate results. 70
The third approach to pattern is known as the multiple episode
test. In essence, this test requires predicate crimes constituting a
pattern to be both related in some respect and to produce injury
separately in time and place.7' Under this standard, multiple mail-
ings or wire communications effecting a single injury do not qualify
as a pattern of racketeering activity. This test has also achieved ap-
propriate results. 72 However, the test risks occasional error by
counting episodes rather than emphasizing "continuity." For exam-
ple, absent some threat of continuity, two distinct criminal episodes
should not automatically qualify as a pattern. On the other hand,
the presence of two episodes ought not be an absolute prerequisite
to pattern, since a single illicit event may sometimes pose a threat of
continuity.73
68 See Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 191-94 (9th Cir. 1987);
Roeder v. Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1987).
69 See Medical Emergency Serv. Assocs. v. Foulke, 844 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir.
1988); Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank, 832 F.2d 36, 38-39 (3d Cir. 1987).
70 See Saporito v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 843 F.2d 666, 676-78 (3d Cir. 1988)
(systemic fraud against multiple victims is pattern); Paradise Hotel Corp. v. Bank of
Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1988) (single bankruptcy not a pattern); Liquid Air
Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1304-05 (7th Cir. 1987) (multiple distinct injuries con-
stitute pattern); Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 1987) (sin-
gle commercial transaction not a pattern); Marks v. Pannell Kerr Forster, 811 F.2d 1108,
1110-12 (7th Cir. 1987) (single limited fraud against single victim not a pattern); Lipin
Enters. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986) (a single sale of stock does not consti-
tute a pattern).
71 See Goldsmith, supra note 54, at 863-64 n.171 (discussing test and setting forth
cases); RICO Cases Committee, Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Associa-
tionJury Instructions for Civil and Criminal RICO Cases with Commentary, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv.
1, 24, 37-40; see also Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986)
(citing other cases). Note that, though the Seventh Circuit has not repudiated the epi-
sode test, recent decisions from that jurisdiction have emphasized the multiple factor
approach to pattern. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. See infra notes 162 &
178 and accompanying text.
72 See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781,
809 (E.D. La. 1986) (fraudulent monthly bills, each inflicting separate injury, constitute
pattern); United States v. Freshie Co., 639 F. Supp. 442, 444-45 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (eleven
bribes over three years constitute a pattern); Soper v. Simmons Int'l, Ltd., 632 F. Supp.
244, 250-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (single fraudulent episode not a pattern).
73 Sometimes, continuity may be inferred from the nature of the crime. For exam-
ple, extortion inherently carries a threat of future criminality. Cf United States v.
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Finally, the most restrictive view of pattern is the multiple
scheme test. Under this rule, a single criminal scheme fails to satisfy
the pattern element regardless of the number of predicates in-
volved.74 The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ini-
tially advanced this doctrine in Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare N.A. v.
Inryco, Inc. 7 5 The court considered whether four illegal kickback
payments, made to a purchasing agent through the mails, consti-
tuted a pattern of racketeering activity. In declining to find a pat-
tern, Judge Milton I. Shadur commented:
"[Plattern" connotes similarity, hence the cases' proper em-
phasis on relatedness of the constituent acts. But "pattern" also
connotes a multiplicity of events: Surely the continuity inherent
in the term presumes repeated criminal activity, not merely re-
peated acts to carry out the same criminal activity. It places a real
strain on the language to speak of a single fraudulent effort, im-
plemented by several fraudulent acts, as a "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity." 76
At first impression, Inryco appears to suggest a multiple episode
test. However, Judge Shadur never considered whether each kick-
back payment might qualify as a distinct episode (with each episode
reflecting a separate injury to plaintiff).77 Moreover, his opinion re-
jected earlier precedent sustaining a single scheme as a pattern and
concluded that "the single scheme does not appear to represent the
necessary 'pattern of racketeering activity.' ",78 Subsequent courts,
eager to restrain the scope of civil RICO, have employed similar
Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983). Simi-
larly, if several murders are committed to facilitate the commission of future offenses,
the fact that the homicides occurred at the same time and place ought not preclude
finding a pattern. Finally, a threat of continuity occasionally may be inferred from the
ongoing operations of the enterprise. Cf United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 190-
91 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3853 (1987) (continuity inferred from ongo-
ing activities of enterprise); United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1474-76 (11 th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986) (single episode homicides constitute pat-
tern). See Reconsideration of Pattern, supra note 45, at 95-96.
74 See Pattern of Confusion, supra note 2, at 1748-49; The Pattern Requirement is Working,
supra note 2, at 215-16.
75 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
76 Id. at 831.
77 Id. at 831-33. Judge Shadur should have considered whether the kickbacks con-
stituted separate payments or merely installments of a single payment. Blakey & Cessar,
supra note 4, at 539 (citing other examples of this distinction in federal law). The Eighth
Circuit likewise failed to consider this issue when it adopted the multiple scheme rule in
Superior Oil Co. v. Fullmer, 785 F.2d 252, 255-58 (8th Cir. 1986). The claim in Superior
Oil could have been properly dismissed simply by recognizing that the complaint essen-
tially alleged a single theft. Blakey & Cessar, supra note 4, at 538. Thus the multiple
scheme test was unnecessary to a proper outcome and actually diverted from proper
analysis.
78 Inryco, 615 F. Supp. at 833.
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analyses to arrive at a multiple scheme requirement. 79
The restrictive effect of the multiple scheme rule is apparent.
Comparison with the multiple episode standard best illustrates this
effect. Consider the following hypothetical: Assume that a defense con-
tractor bribes a government purchasing agent to obtain inside information for a
series of bids to construct military aircraft. They agree that each time the con-
tractor wins a bid on this basis, the contractor will mail a check for $35, 000 to
the agent's bank account in a foreign country. This scenario properly
qualifies as a pattern under the multiple episode test. Each $35,000
payment is a distinct criminal event reflecting independent harm to
the government and to competing contractors. Thus, though argua-
bly only a single scheme, it violates RICO. Under the multiple
scheme test, however, this scenario does not satisfy the pattern ele-
ment and RICO does not apply.
Of course, it is arguable that the preceding scenario actually in-
volves multiple schemes-with each bid amounting to a separate
scheme. However, the application of RICO then turns on how a
court chooses to characterize the crime or crimes at issue. Presuma-
bly, "good" RICO cases would be viewed as multiple schemes, and
"bad" RICO cases would be rejected as "mere" single schemes. A
standard so prone to result-oriented decisions is no standard at
all.80 As applied, the multiple scheme rule resembles the previously
rejected organized crime limitation. Courts routinely dismiss civil
RICO claims against white collar defendants under its rubric.8'
This restrictive approach to pattern contradicts Sedima, and cannot
be justified by statutory text, legislative history, or sound policy.
Sedima contains no language suggesting that pattern should be
determined by a multiple scheme standard. Indeed, though the
complaint in Sedima alleged only a single fraudulent scheme,8 2 Jus-
tice White did not question the pleading's validity. Nor did the
Court rule that two predicate acts, standing alone, may never consti-
tute a pattern of racketeering activity. The opinion merely states the
"implication ... that while two acts are necessary, they may not be
79 See Superior Oil Co. v. Fullmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986); Professional
Assets Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, 616 F. Supp. 1418, 1421-22 (W.D. Okla.
1985). See also Pitts v. Turner & Boisseau, Chartered, 850 F.2d 650, 652 (10th Cir. 1988)
(implicitly moving towards a multiple scheme standard). In addition, some courts,
though declining to adopt the multiple scheme test, have imposed other requirements
on the pattern element. For example, the Fourth Circuit has suggested that pattern may
not be established absent allegations of "ongoing unlawful activities whose scope and
persistence pose a special threat to social well-being." International Data Bank v.
Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987).
80 See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
81 See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
82 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 483-84.
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sufficient."83 Furthermore, the Court surely did not intend subse-
quent interpretations of pattern to focus exclusively on dictum con-
tained in a footnote. Other aspects of Sedima must also be
considered.
The thrust of Sedima is consistent with RICO's broad remedial
purpose. Of primary import, the Court struck down two judicially
imposed limitations designed to eviscerate the statute.8 4 In doing
so, Justice White looked to the law's text and rejected the claim that
"Congress could have no 'inkling of [RICO's] implications'" for
white collar crime.8 5 RICO's text, he properly observed, applies to
"any person."8 6 Futhermore, Sedima stressed that courts should not
impose "novel" limitations absent supporting legislative history.8 7
Finally, Justice White observed that "[t]he statute's 'remedial pur-
poses' are nowhere more evident than in the provision of a private
action for those injured by racketeering activity."88 The Court ac-
cordingly rejected narrow statutory interpretations intended to
render civil RICO useless against white collar institutions. Instead,
Justice White stated that "[t]he fact that [civil RICO] is used against
respected businesses allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically
identified criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming
that the provision is being misconstrued."8 9 Sedima's broad view of
RICO is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, 90 and provides
83 Id. at 496 n.14 (emphasis added).
84 Id at 485-86.
85 Id. at 495 n.13.
86 Id at 495.
87 Id at 490.
88 Id at 498. The Court qualified this statement by suggesting, at least for pur-
poses of argument, that the liberal construction clause might not apply to sections 1961
and 1962. Id. at 495 n.10. Congress, however, drew no such distinction. The liberal
construction requirement applies to Title IX in its entirety, Pub. L. No. 91-452 § 904(a),
84 Stat. 947 (1970), and neither the Supreme Court nor the majority of federal courts
have applied the clause in such a restrictive manner. Cf United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 587-93 (1981) (interpreting enterprise element). See, e.g., United States v.
Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 352-53 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d
1404, 1419 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2022 (1988); United States v. Licavoli,
725 F.2d 1040, 1045 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); United States v. Maz-
zei, 700 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983). See also Williams v. Hall,
683 F. Supp. 639, 642 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (RICO must be liberally construed. Section
1962(d) conspiracy upheld.) The contrary rule of lenity has been abolished in most
jurisdictions. Indeed, the rule of lenity is irrelevant in this context since its application is
limited to situations in which the legislature has failed to express a preference for how
ambiguities in a statute are to be construed. N. SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION §§ 45.02 & 45.09 (1984). This is not the case with RICO. See generally
Blakey, supra note 26, at 245 n.25, 288-90 n.150; Blakey & Cessar, supra note 4, at 532
n.21. See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
89 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
90 Two Supreme Court decisions addressed RICO before Sedima. On each occa-
sion, the Court construed the statute broadly, consistent with its remedial objectives. See
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the context within which the multiple scheme test must be
considered.
Turning first to statutory text, RICO provides no basis for im-
posing a multiple scheme requirement. The word "scheme" does
not appear in the law, much less in any statutory treatment of pat-
tern. 91 Whereas "scheme" implicitly requires an examination of a
violator's state of mind, RICO characterizes "pattern" in terms of
"acts." 92 RICO uses no concepts even remotely suggestive of a
multiple scheme requirement. Moreover, the multiple scheme test
is squarely contrary to the explicit text of section 1962(b), which
necessarily applies to single schemes. 93
The multiple scheme requirement also finds no support in the
legislative history. As initially proposed, pattern included a mini-
mum requirement of only a single predicate act after the effective
date of the statute.94 In response to Justice Department criticism, 95
Congress amended the pattern element to provide for a two-predi-
cate minimum. The Justice Department, however, opposed any fur-
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 587-90 (1981).
91 See Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987) (" 'scheme'
is hardly a self defining term, and it appears nowhere in the RICO statute"); Sun Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1987) ("neither RICO's language
nor Sedima's interpretation of it supports a requirement of substantive unconnectedness,
i.e., separate episodes or schemes.").
92 The multiple scheme test requires analyzing the defendant's state of mind be-
cause the presence of multiple objectives depends upon his intent. As a consequence,
the multiple scheme standard encourages semantic games. See infra note 105 and ac-
companying text. The benefit of focusing on acts of conduct is analyzed infra notes 171-
96 and accompanying text.
93 Section 1962(b) prohibits acquiring an interest in an enterprise through a pat-
tern of racketeering. Therefore, this prohibition, by definition, contemplates a single
scheme: the illicit acquisitions of an interest in an enterprise. See, e.g., United States v.
Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). The
multiple scheme requirement would nullify this prohibition. See Goldsmith, supra note
54, at 865 n.175 (citing case law). See also infra note 97. Likewise, both sections 1962(a)
and (d) are concerned with activity that does not necessarily involve multiple schemes.
For example, the section 1962(a) prohibition against investing the proceeds of racke-
teering activity in an enterprise reflects congressional concern with money laundering;
see Lynch, supra note 32, at 681; Note, Investing Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970, 83 YALE LJ. 1491, 1493 (1974). Money laundering, how-
ever, is a serious social problem irrespective of whether multiple schemes generated the
funds. Similarly, section 1962(d), which outlaws conspiracy to violate RICO, potentially
reaches inchoate conduct-such as a contemplated single scheme-that has not yet rip-
ened into multiple schemes. Imposition of a multiple scheme requirement under such
circumstances would be "absurd" and "surprising." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587.
94 S.1861, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 9569 (1969) (" 'pattern of racke-
teering activity' includes at least one act occurring after the effective date of this chap-
ter"). Another precursor to RICO used the term "criminal activity" rather than pattern.
See S.1963, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6995 (1969). It included "any act";
multiple acts were not required.
95 See Senate OCCA Report, supra note 24, at 122.
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ther constraints on pattern. Assistant Attorney General Will
Wilson, when asked to comment on a proposed three-predicate
minimum, responded that such "additional requirements would
make [RICO] virtually unenforcible [sic]." 96 Obviously, the Depart-
ment would have opposed a more demanding multiple scheme re-
quirement, and there is no indication that Congress ever considered
it.97
Instead, the legislative record suggests that Congress intended
to give pattern its ordinary meaning.98 At the time, this meant that
the activity must not be "isolated" or "sporadic." 99 Consistent with
this theme, the Senate Report accompanying RICO states that it is
the "factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to pro-
duce a pattern."' 0 0 Continuity and relationship, however, are po-
tentially mutually exclusive concepts under a multiple scheme test.
To the extent that a complaint alleges multiple schemes, it becomes
more difficult to allege the requisite "relationship" factor; however,
when a close relationship between predicates is alleged, the events
are more prone to be characterized as merely a single scheme. Con-
sequently, counsel faces an absurd conflict between pleading con-
96 Organized Crime Controk Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, on S.30 and Related Praposals, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 664 (1970) (statement of Will
Wilson) [hereinafter Organized Crime Control Hearings].
97 See Lawaetz v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 653 F. Supp. 1278, 1286 (D. St. Croix 1987)
("RICO's language and legislative history are devoid of a multiple episode require-
ment."). Cf J.G. Williams v. Regency Properties, Ltd., 672 F. Supp. 1436, 1441 (N.D.
Ga. 1987) (compromise position more consistent with the legislative history). Indeed,
Senators Byrd and Dole provided examples of racketeering against which RICO was
aimed that constituted single scheme activity. 116 CONG. REC. 607 (1970) (arson-mur-
der scheme designed to compel supermarket chain to purchase detergent sold by mob-
controlled company); 116 CONG. REc. 36,296 (1970) (same). The Senate Report accom-
panying RICO provides other examples of single scheme activity that is within the stat-
ute. E.g., Senate OCCA Report, supra note 24, at 77 (bankruptcy bustout). "Bustout"
scams are particularly enlightening. See generally Davidson, Schemes and Methods Used in
Perpetrating Bankruptcy Frauds, 71 CON. LJ. 383 (1966). For a pre-RICO example, see
United States v. Wolcoff, 379 F.2d 521, 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 929 (1967).
For a post-RICO example, see Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan, 727 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1984).
Such scams seldom involve more than a single scheme or last longer than a relatively
brief period and they usually envision the end of the enterprise that is acquired and
fraudulently put out of business. It is difficult, if not impossible, to square the paradig-
matic bustout scheme with some post-Sedima efforts to restrict RICO, not only involving
"pattern," but also involving "enterprise." Here, too, these results are contrary to man-
ifest congressional intent. See, e.g., Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898, 903 (2d Cir. 1987)
(no RICO violation; partnership must continue to be enterprise).
98 Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 96, at 665 (statement of Ronald L.
Gainer) ("pattern has to be construed with its normal meaning"); see also infra note 99.
99 See 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Senator McClellan); id. at 35,193
(statement of Representative Poff).
100 Senate OCCA Report, supra note 24, at 158.
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tinuity and relationship. 0 1 Congress could not have intended such
a dilemma.
Finally, the multiple scheme test fails from a policy standpoint.
First, it confers RICO immunity upon single scheme activity regard-
less of duration.'0 2 Second, though courts tolerate such results in
civil cases, the potentially adverse consequences in worthwhile crim-
inal cases will likely cause uneven application. 10 3 Third, the multi-
ple scheme standard is imprecise. As yet, no court has clearly
defined it.104 Consequently, RICO defendants are motivated to
generalize the allegations against them, and plaintiffs artificially at-
tempt to splinter each claim into a multiplicity of schemes. 10 5 Chaos
results.
Perhaps for these reasons, none of the five amicus briefs filed by
civil RICO opponents in H.J. Inc. even attempts to justify the multi-
ple scheme rule. ' 06 Instead, most urge a pattern standard that limits
RICO to traditional organized crime cases and excludes white collar
criminal activity from its realm. Because this view of pattern lacks
foundation, it must be rejected.
101 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 54, at 865 n.175 (citing cases recognizing this
dilemma).
102 See Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting
multiple scheme test, in part for this reason); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d
970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986) (same). The Eighth Circuit, however, has tolerated such results
in civil cases. See Ornest v. Delaware North Cos., 818 F.2d 651, 652 (8th Cir. 1987)
(skimming concession commissions during eight-year period not a pattern); Deviries v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1986) (churning during six-year
period not a pattern).
103 For example, the Eighth Circuit has struggled to find multiple schemes in the
context of a single RICO narcotics conspiracy. United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842,
860 (8th Cir. 1987). In Kragness, the Court indulged in some creative dissection of de-
fendants' trafficking activities and found multiple schemes because defendants had im-
ported a variety of narcotics. Had the case involved a single type of narcotic, the court
could not have reached this result. See also County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting
Co., 685 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Were the alleged scheme one of a criminal mob
rather than [a power company], appeal from a conviction on continuity grounds would
be laughed out of court.").
104 Thus, it "merely substitutes one set of definitional problems for another." Roe-
der v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Paul S. Mullin & As-
socs., Inc. v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 532, 541 (D. Del. 1986).
105 Such techniques ought not be tolerated. They are made possible by the elastic
character of the term "scheme." See supra note 92. To avoid these practices, courts must
establish a standard that does not promote such lawyering. SeeJones v. Lampe, 845 F.2d
755, 758 (7th Cir. 1988) (may not splinter a single fraud into component parts);
Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1987) (criticizing
"semantical game of generalizing the illegal objective" and focusing instead on "dis-
crete criminal events") (Higgenbotham, J.).
106 Indeed, even respondent Northwestern Bell Telephone Company does not at-
tempt to sustain the multiple scheme test on its merits. Instead, Respondent's Brief
focuses on the facts and argues that, given the allegations, no pattern exists under any
reasonable standard. Respondent's Brief, supra note 1, at 31-45.
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IV
THE ORGANIZED CRIME LIMITATION ON PATTERN
The amicus briefs in H.J. Inc. take different approaches in argu-
ing for an organized crime based pattern limitation. One brief ar-
gues expressly that courts must interpret pattern narrowly to reach
only traditional organized crime.10 7 Others pursue the same result
without expressly calling for an organized crime limitation.10 8 Both
positions are deceptively simple. Both are wrong. And both
threaten to make RICO the sort of status-based offense Congress
expressly rejected.109
Though the amici characterize their arguments somewhat differ-
ently, they advance common grounds for limiting pattern. Their ar-
gument essentially attempts to combine the "ordinary meaning" of
pattern with RICO's historic focus on organized crime. The follow-
ing summary presents this erroneous position: Based on dictionary
definitions of pattern, "a single theme dominates: 'pattern' means
actions that 'characterize' or 'typify' a person's conduct." 10 Legisla-
tive history supports this interpretation. RICO arose as an effort-to
combat organized crime. Because constitutional constraints against
status-based offenses preclude outlawing membership in organized
crime, Congress adopted the pattern element to criminalize conduct
committed by organized crime members. As Congress considered
this issue, it imposed a series of progressively restrictive changes on
the pattern element which culminated in existing law. Given the
legislative emphasis on organized crime, "[b]oth the creation of the
'pattern' requirement and the successful efforts to narrow it re-
flected Congress' continuing effort to create a formulation that
would attack habitual or career criminals without sweeping in other
criminals, much less people who are engaged primarily in lawful and
respected business and professional endeavors."' Thus, RICO's
sponsors stated that its reach beyond organized crime would only be
"incidental."' 12 To achieve this result, these amid contend, pattern
must mean "typical" or "characteristic" behavior.11 Furthermore,
they argue that, this definition necessarily excludes single criminal
107 WLF Brief, supra note 15, at 3.
108 AICPA Brief, supra note 15, at 3; NAM Brief, supra note 15, at 3; AFL-CIO Brief,
supra note 15, at 3-4.
109 See Goldsmith, supra note 18, at 790 ("RICO was drafted in response to status-
based criticisms of [an earlier bill]."). The amid briefs radically changed the major issue
being considered by the Supreme Court. Though the Court initially granted certiorari to
address the multiple scheme requirement, see supra note 11, the proposed organized
crime-type limitation will probably receive the most attention.
110 AICPA Brief, supra note 15, at 7.
111 Id. at 13-14.
112 Id. at 14.
113 Id. at 15.
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episodes or situations in which the defendant's racketeering activity
does not amount to a "substantial" part of his overall conduct. 114
Accordingly, the amid cite Seventh Circuit case law suggesting that
"the 'pattern requirement was intended to limit RICO to those
cases in which racketeering acts are committed in a manner character-
izing the defendant as a person who regularly commits such
crimes.' "115
This argument distorts both the language and intent of RICO.
First, under the proposed definition, pattern modifies the person
and enterprise elements of RICO instead of the conduct contem-
plated by the term "pattern of racketeering activity." Both the per-
son and enterprise elements, however, are separately defined in
provisions that expressly extend beyond traditional organized crime
and do not touch upon the concept of professional or habitual crim-
inal.116 These provisions contrast sharply with other sections of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 that are specifically limited to
organized crime or are otherwise restricted to career criminals. 117
Second, since the statutory text uses "pattern" to modify "racke-
teering activity," the law requires only that the predicate acts them-
selves constitute a pattern; it does not require proof of some larger
pattern involving the defendant's overall affairs. 118 Finally, in con-
114 Id at 19-20.
115 Id at 7 (quoting Lipin Enters. Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986)).
116 See supra notes 25 & 38 and accompanying text.
117 See 18 U.S.C. § 510, 84 Stat. 933 (witness protection program); 18 U.S.C. § 3503,
84 Stat. 934 (depositions to preserve testimony). Ironically, even these provisions have
not been confined to traditional organized crime. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 493
F.2d 704, 707-08 (2d Cir. 1974) (deposition to preserve testimony in white collar crime
case). Cf 82 Stat. 209 (1968) (Title I of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
containing definition of organized crime). The presence of such language in other sec-
tions of the Organized Crime Control Act has accounted for the reluctance of some
courts to impose an organized crime limitation on RICO. See supra note 38. Moreover,
Congress has since eliminated these organized crime limitations. Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89
Stat. 373, 374 (1975); Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 3546 (1984). See also infra notes 123-
24 and accompanying text (Dangerous Special Offenders law limited to habitual offend-
ers, professional criminals, and organized crime violators).
118 Cf Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (RICO "is used
against respected businesses allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically identified crimi-
nal conduct .. ") (emphasis added). By analogy, courts have properly rejected the
proposition that an alleged pattern lacks continuity unless the crime is ongoing at the
time the RICO suit is pending:
[S]uch a requirement would produce anomalous results. This approach
would allow a party to maintain a RICO claim if he brought suit before
the unlawful scheme had attained its objective.... This same interpreta-
tion.., would deny a RICO cause of action in a case where the scheme
had fully accomplished its goal. Yet it is the completed scheme that in-
flicts the greater harm and more strongly implicates the remedial pur-
poses of RICO.
Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3rd Cir. 1987); see also Sun Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 194 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987).
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trast to other federal laws employing pattern terminology, RICO
neither requires other criminal episodes"19 nor characterizes the
pattern element in enhanced terms. 120 Instead, RICO only limits
pattern by requiring at least two related predicates within ten years
of each other. 12 1
The attempts of amid to limit RICO to habitual or career
criminals also ignore the structure of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970.122 Title X of that Act, entitled the Dangerous Special
Offenders law, already reaches habitual and career criminals.' 23 In
contrast to RICO, Title X's legislative history expressly emphasizes
concepts such as "habitual" and "professional" criminals.' 24 Title
X is designed to be a potential sentence enhancer applicable to all
federal felonies, including RICO, that involve aggravated forms of
criminality. 125 Accordingly, it is illogical to read its enhancement
concepts into RICO, which is actually subordinate to Title X. To do
so restricts RICO only to Title X's vision of aggravated criminality,
thereby improperly merging two separate titles of the same Act.
Congress did not intend this result, since it used special language to
limit the operation of a comparable pattern provision in Title X but
119 The habitual offender provision of the Special Dangerous Offenders law requires
at least two prior offenses "committed on occasions different from one another." 18
U.S.C. § 3575(e)(1) (1982). Though this requirement does not modify the statute's pat-
tern component, it is contained in a parallel provision of the law. Furthermore, section
3575(e)(2) of that statute, which utilizes pattern, requires that the pattern must have
"constituted a substantial source of his income." See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S.
770, 787 (1975); United States v. Felder, 744 F.2d 18, 19 (3d Cir. 1984). See infra note
126 and accompanying text.
120 Cf 7 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1982) ("consistent pattern"); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986) ("extraordinary pattern"); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1082(g)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1986) ("clear and consistent pattern"); 49 U.S.C.
§ 521(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) ("serious pattern"); 49 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1982)
("continuing pattern."); see also supra note 119.
121 See supra note 5. Though Congress recognized that more than two predicates will
usually be required, the two-predicate minimum obviously contemplates the possibility
of a two-act pattern. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the amid
fail to recognize that Congress, in effect, has defined pattern in terms of "continuity plus
relationship." Supra text accompanying note 8. Therefore, the task is now to define
"continuity plus relationship" rather than to define pattern.
122 Structure is relevant in reading RICO. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2765 (1987); Russello, 462 U.S. at 22-23; Turkette, 452 U.S. at
582, 587.
123 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1982).
124 Senate OCCA Report, supra note 24, at 164-65; Organized Crime Control Act of
1979, H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61-62 (1970) [hereinafter House Re-
port]. The legislative history to Title X also refers to "organized crime" offenders in
connection with the sentence enhancement provision intended to apply to them. IME In
contrast, similar terminology does not appear in congressional reports addressing
RICO's pattern element. See Senate OCCA Report, supra note 24, at 158; House Report,
supra, at 4010, 4037.
125 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982). RICO could then only have an aggravated form of
violation.
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not in Title IX (RICO). Title X, in pertinent part, intends that "the
pattern must be a substantial source of the defendant's in-
come. .... "126 Though no similar language appears in RICO or its
legislative history, 127 amici ask that the court read it into the stat-
ute. 128 There is no basis for doing so. Moreover, even if Title X's
version of habitual offender were incorporated into RICO, the Dan-
gerous Special Offender law requires three independent convictions
to qualify an individual for this status. 129 Thus, a lifetime of crime is
not required before an offender may be characterized as a habitual
criminal. 130 Under the amici position, however, three acts would vir-
tually never constitute a pattern since three instances rarely charac-
terize a person's overall conduct.' 3 '
In contrast, Congress recognized that two predicates may not
always qualify as a pattern but opted to address this element flexibly
by declining to adopt a proposal calling for three predicates. 132
Rather than respect this flexibility, amid seek to unduly restrain the
pattern element in two ways: 1) by arbitrarily precluding single epi-
sodes (involving multiple predicates) from qualifying as a pattern,
amici disregard the possibility that the particular criminal activity or
the enterprise itself may imply a threat of continuity; 133 and 2) by
requiring that a pattern must be characteristic of a defendant's af-
fairs generally (and constitute a substantial portion thereof), amici
seek to confine RICO to enterprises that are wholly corrupt.'3 4
Ironically, this position constitutes the obverse of the argument, re-
jected by the Supreme Court in United States v. Turkette, that RICO
only applies to legitimate businesses. 135 In contrast, under the in-
terpretation proposed by amid, white collar institutions would no
longer be subject to RICO because the vast majority of their activity
is ordinarily legitimate. 136
126 Senate OCCA Report, supra note 24, at 165; see supra note 119 and accompanying
text.
127 See supra note 5; Senate OCCA Report, supra note 24, at 158-59.
128 See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
129 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(1) (1982).
130 Other habitual offender laws ordinarily do not require more than three prior
offenses. See, e.g., N. KrrTREY & E. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING, AND CORRECTIONS:
LAw, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 632-37 (1981) (citing extensive authority).
131 Cf FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee note (observing that "[c]haracter is a
generalized description of one's disposition" and that habit "describes one's regular
response to a repeated specific situation").
132 See supra notes 30 & 96 and accompanying text.
133 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
134 See AICPA Brief, supra note 15, at 27 (illustrative RICO cases limited to corrupt
organizations); NAM Brief, supra note 15, at 18-21 (same).
135 Supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
136 For example, a corporation may have a twenty-year record of profitability
through wholly legitimate practices, but then be motivated by sudden economic pres-
sures to engage in systemic fraud for six months. Under such circumstances, a long
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Such a result is not justified from any standpoint. It ignores
RICO's title, which extends to "Racketeer Influenced" as well as to
"Corrupt Organizations." 137 It also disregards statutory definitions
that obviously include white collar institutions as potential defend-
ants and designate certain frauds as predicate offenses.138 These
provisions, which were recognized by the Supreme Court in
Sedima,'3 9 are supported by extensive legislative history indicating
an intent to reach white collar criminal activity. 140 For example,
whereas bills preceding RICO focused either on licit or illicit enter-
prises,14 1 RICO addresses both types of organizations. 142 Similarly,
in contrast to RICO antecedents limiting predicate offenses to
crimes closely associated with organized crime, RICO incorporated
white collar offenses despite criticism that doing so creates a statute
of inordinate breadth.'43 Congress extended RICO to white collar
activity because it recognized that persons such as accountants,
bankers, and lawyers also engage in extensive crime. 144 Thus, Con-
gress viewed RICO as an opportunity for widespread reform. 145
This phenomenon is reflected throughout the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, as Congress expanded several other titles be-
record of legitimacy ought not preclude the application of RICO. Cf Liquid Air Corp. v.
Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1303-05 (7th Cir. 1987) (nineteen separate acts causing injury
over seven-month period constitute pattern). Nor should RICO be precluded if a corpo-
ration restricts its illicit activities to one percent of its overall business practices. See infra
notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
137 See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 18, at 1025 n.91 (discussing the development
and significance of RICO's tide).
138 See supra notes 25-27 & 38 and accompanying text. In contrast, by focusing on
the so-called professional criminal, the model proposed by amid predominantly contem-
plates only individuals being sued or prosecuted. Furthermore, the proposal is likely to
raise definitional problems akin to those that originally accounted for rejection of an
organized crime limitation. See supra notes 32-33 & 38 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
141 See Goldsmith, supra note 18, at 777, 782-83. Compare S.2187, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., 111 CONG. REC. 14,680 (1965) (illicit organization), with S.1623, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 6992 (1969) (licit enterprise).
142 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 26 & 31 and accompanying text.
144 See 113 CONG. REc. 17,998 (1967) (statement of Senator Hruska, RICO co-spon-
sor, mentioning infiltration and corruption of brokerage houses and accounting firms);
113 CONG. REC. 17,950 (1967) (statement of Representative McClory, RICO co-spon-
sor, observing that "business racketeers" and "criminal cartels employ staffs of attor-
neys, accountants, and business consultants" to "protect themselves from suit and
prosecution"); 116 CONG. REc. 592 (1970) (statement of Senator McClellan, RICO co-
sponsor, providing list of corrupted businesses which included accounting, banking, in-
surance, and securities firms); see also Papai v. Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402, 1411 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) ("to the extent RICO is used as a weapon against 'white collar crime,' this
purpose is not contrary to the intent of Congress but is in fact one of the 'benefits'
Congress saw the Act as providing").
145 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
yond their initial organized crime context. 146
Furthermore, although Senator John L. McClellan, RICO's
principal sponsor, intended only an "incidental" 147 reach beyond
"organized crime," he never considered organized crime to be lim-
ited to the Mafia. 148 Nor would there by any reason to exclude or-
ganized white collar crime from a statute designed to attack
enterprise criminality. 149 Indeed, no other federal statute, con-
ceived in response to organized crime, has been applied in so lim-
ited a manner. 150 On the contrary, the Court has not hesitated to
apply such legislation to defendants not associated with traditional
organized crime.1 51
RICO has been used to successfully attack organized white col-
146 See, e.g., United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 674 (10th Cir. 1982) (Title X, 18
U.S.C. § 3575); United States v. Box, 530 F.2d 1258, 1265 n.19 (5th Cir. 1976) (Title
VIII, 18 U.S.C. § 1955); United States v. Schwanke, 598 F.2d 575, 578 (10th Cir. 1979)
(Title XI, 18 U.S.C. § 841-48). See also supra note 33 and accompanying text; Oversight on
Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 430
(1985) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings on Civil RICO Suits] (statement of National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General-National District Attorneys Association) (reviewing legisla-
tive history).
147 AICPA Brief, supra note 15, at 14 (quoting Senator McClellan). Contrary to the
AICPA Brief, the term "incidental" does not necessarily mean "minor"; it also means
"concomitant." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1142 (1971).
148 See COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING, GAM-
BLING IN AMERICA 181-82 (1976) (statement of Senator McClellan) ("[Iln none of the
hearings or in the processing of legislation in which I have been involved has the term
[organized crime] been used in this circumscribed fashion.").
149 See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
150 See Blakey, Definition of Organized Crime in Statutes and Law Enforcement Administration,
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 511-80 (1986) (extensive anal-
ysis of judicial decisions interpreting statutes aimed at organized crime).
151 For example, although the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982), originated as
anti-racketeering legislation, the Supreme Court has declined to require proof of some
form of judicially defined racketeering as a prerequisite to conviction. United States v.
Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373-77 (1978). In reaching this result, the Court emphasized the
absence of statutory text or legislative history suggesting congressional intent to limit
the law to organized crime, and stated that the absence of a statutory definition of racke-
teering could create problems of vagueness. Id. Significantly, RICO defines racketeer-
ing in terms not limited to traditional organized crime, supra note 26 and accompanying
text, and RICO's sponsors expressed similar concerns about the constitutionality of leg-
islation limited to organized crime. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. See also
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 46-48 (1979) (Statute prohibiting interstate travel
"in aid of racketeering enterprises" is not limited to organized crime and includes white
collar criminal activity); United States v. Fabrizio, 385 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1966) (anti-
gambling statute, enacted as part of Attorney General's organized crime package, is not
limited to traditional organized crime; "[a] statute limited without a clear definition of
the covered group, as would be the case with § 1953 under appellee's view of it, might
raise serious constitutional problems").
As amic offer no definition of professional or career criminal, similar vagueness
problems would arise if such terminology were read into RICO. In this respect, it would
be inappropriate to rely on Title X's definition because Congress did not use these con-
cepts in RICO. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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lar criminals including politicians, 15 2 judges, 5 3 lawyers,' 54 account-
ants, 155 businesses, and businessmen. 156 However, because such
cases usually involve individuals or entities whose activities are
predominantly licit, similar efforts would fail under the definition of
pattern advanced by amici.157 The facts of H.J. Inc. illustrate this un-
fortunate result. The complaint alleges that, during a period en-
compassing several years, Northwestern Bell bribed members of the
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission. Although the bribes given
to each of several commissioners allegedly exceeded $100,000, amid
argue that RICO does not apply because this activity represents an
insubstantial portion of Northwestern Bell's overall legitimate busi-
ness. 158 This view of pattern is so restrictive that it may even
threaten the application of RICO against traditional organized
crime activities. 159 Ultimately, however, the white collar offender
152 See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 994-95 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1072 (1982) (office of the governor); United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1074-75 (5th Cir. 1981) (Flor-
ida's Third Judicial Circuit); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985)
(state judge prosecuted under Operation Greylord).
154 See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1185-86 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(lawyers and city council members), rev'd on other grounds and conviction reinstated, 673 F.2d
578 (3d Cir. 1982).
155 See Schact v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983);
Blakey & Cessar, supra note 4, at 566-67 n.187 (noting accountant's multimillion dollar
settlement in major fraud litigation).
156 See, e.g., United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1170 (1983); United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 765-66 (9th Cir.
1980) (foreign corporations).
157 The following excerpt from an amicus brief illustrates that this result is precisely
what RICO opponents seek to achieve:
The instant case raises.., the following question: does a plaintiff (or
a prosecutor) state a case under ... (RICO) ... by pleading that certain
officials and agents of a business corporation-which, in fact provides a
useful, lawful service... have repeatedly over a number of years commit-
ted a particular type of criminal wrong... in order to further the corpo-
ration's business interests? We submit that the answer to that question is
"no.,
AFL-CIO Brief, supra note 15, at 3. If the answer is no, the battle against white collar
crime will suffer an unprecedented setback. For example, RICO would not be applica-
ble to the recent Pentagon procurement scandal because the activities of most defense
contractors are predominantly licit. See generally The Enemy Within, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., July 4, 1988, at 16. Indeed, an adverse ruling on the pattern issue may result in
previous convictions being vacated. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248, 254
(6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 1987).
158 AICPA Brief, supra note 15, at 28; NAM Brief, supra note 15, at 18.
159 For example, organized crime's infiltration of a business does not necessarily
result in the enterprise subsequently being conducted predominantly through illicit
means. Instead, the enterprise may serve as a legitimate front for money laundering or
other illegal activities. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME-ANNOTA-
TIONS AND CONSULTANTS' PAPERS, TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME 4 (1967); see also
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stands to receive the most benefit from an unduly narrow interpreta-
tion of pattern. However, given both the gravity of white collar
crime today 60 and RICO's explicit text,161 excluding such offenders
from coverage is intolerable.
Additional factors militate against an organized-crime limita-
tion for pattern. First, regularity, as an aspect of pattern, has not
been applied restrictively, even by the circuit court initially advanc-
ing this limitation. Rather, regularity of criminal activity is one of
several factors determining the existence of pattern.' 62 Second,
since the word "pattern" may properly have a variety of mean-
ings, 163 there is no basis in law for giving it the narrowest possible
interpretation-especially in a statute which is governed by a liberal
construction clause 64 and which anticipates different meanings in
different sections. 165 Third, to the extent that amici claim that pat-
THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUN-
DERING: INTERIM REPORT, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME 11, 26 (1984)
(involvement of legitimate businesses in money laundering). Significantly, money laun-
dering has recently been added as a RICO predicate offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp.
IV 1986). Bankruptcy bustouts, though classic organized crime activity, might likewise
fail to qualify as a pattern. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 54, at 832-34 (noting that fraud losses exceed
$200 billion annually); Oversight Hearings on Civil RICO Suits, supra note 146, at 633, 647-
50 (statement of National Association of Attorneys General) (emphasizing lack of
prosecutorial resources). The Supreme Court is aware of the extent of the problem:
"White-collar crime is 'the most serious and all-pervasive problem in America today.'
Although this statement was made in 1980, there is no reason to think the problem has
diminished in the meantime." Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2294 n.9
(1988) (citation omitted).
161 See supra notes 25-26 & 38 and accompanying text.
162 See S.K. Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., 852 F.2d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting "multiplicity of schemes as the definite touchstone").
163 See supra notes 1, 73 & 93 and accompanying text. Indeed, given the variety of
potential enterprises, racketeering activities, and prohibitions that arise under RICO,
the term pattern may occur in at least 240 different contexts. Brief of Amici Curiae Attor-
ney General Robert K. Corbin, et. al, at 10 n.17 (" 'Pattern' may be used in RICO viola-
tion in at least 240 different contexts [3 (sections) x 5 (kinds of enterprises) x 4 (kinds of
predicate offenses) x 4 (roles in violations) = 240]."). The definition of pattern must be
sufficiently accommodating to work well in each of these contexts. Significantly, it is not
unusual for the same word to have different meanings in different contexts. See, e.g.,
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum, 339 U.S. 667, 678 (1950) ("The same word, in
different settings, may not mean the same thing."); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819) ("Such is the character of human language, that no word con-
veys to the mind in all situations, one single definite idea. . ."); Holmes, supra note 1, at
417-20.
164 See supra notes 23 & 88 and accompanying text. The liberal construction direc-
tive is critical because, given the choice between a narrow or broad construction of any
element, it necessitates choosing the broader interpretation. See supra note 88 (citing
cases adopting broad interpretation).
165 See supra notes 1, 73, 93 & 163 and accompanying text. If pattern means only
"characteristic" or "typical" conduct, supra note 104 and accompanying text, RICO sec-
tions 1962(a), (b), and (d) will often be rendered nullities just as they would be under
the multiple scheme test. Supra notes 93 & 159 and accompanying text.
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tern must be confined to quell civil RICO abuse, 166 their argument
to the Court is misdirected. Such issues require legislative action
rather than judicial reinterpretation of a basic statutory element.' 67
Moreover, the record indicates that claims of abuse and judicial
overload made by RICO opponents have been exaggerated in a bla-
tant effort to avoid statutory liability.' 68 Fourth, restricting pattern
under RICO may likewise curtail similar terminology in other fed-
eral legislation.' 69 Thus, the resolution of this issue stands to have
systemic consequences. For these reasons, this latest attempt to re-
write 70 the RICO statute should be rejected.
Fortunately, the pattern issue may be resolved without effects
adverse to RICO or other federal laws. An appropriate solution
may be derived from both RICO's text and other applications of
pattern terminology in federal jurisprudence.
V
THE MEANING OF PATrERN
Ironically, most attempts to resolve the pattern issue have failed
to consider all available statutory text. The definition of pattern
contained in section 1961(5) is only a starting point. Because the
provision "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,"' 171 one
must also consider the term "racketeering activity." RICO defines
racketeering activity by providing a list of predicate crimes in sec-
tion 1961(1). Each crime designated as racketeering activity is char-
acterized as either an "act," "threat," or "offense."' 172 This choice
166 NAM Brief, supra note 15, at 22-26; WLF Brief, supra note 15, at 9.
167 See Sedirna, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985). Ironically, the
most recent proposals to reform RICO do not seek to restrict the pattern element. See
Pattern of Confusion, supra note 2, at 1783. If the amid pattern arguments were legitimate,
one would expect pattern to be a central focus of their lobbying efforts. The absence of
such an effort belies their arguments before the Supreme Court.
168 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 54, at 838-48; Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO
Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 55, 68-71 (abuse issue has been
grossly misrepresented); Note, supra note 57, at 874-82. Note that the number of RICO
filings has leveled off at approximately 1000 per annum. N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1988, at 1,
col. 5 & 84, col. 6. Moreover, approximately sixty percent of these cases are also based
on otherjurisdictional grounds. Blakey & Cessar, supra note 4, at 619. See chart on next
page. Thus, such litigation does not overwhelm federal courts.
169 See supra note 120 and accompanying text; infra notes 187-91 and accompanying
text.
170 In effect, amid propose re-writing the statutory definition of ."pattern" so that it
would modify "person" as follows: "'person' means [includes] any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property and who habitually or t)pically
engages in professional or organized crime-type criminal activity." See also supra note 55.
171 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
172 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. III 1985). Although some might consider the terms
"act" and "offense" to be interchangeable, Congress must have intended them to have
different meanings. The text of RICO is very specific, particularly in its definitional sec-
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of terminology is important because, under some federal laws, a
single criminal act may produce numerous offenses. 173 As applied to
RICO, this doctrine means that pattern may be absent when multi-
ple "offenses" only effect a single act of racketeering activity.174
This statutory interpretation precludes the application of RICO
to most routine commercial disputes. 175 Such disputes typically in-
volve numerous communications, each of which may qualify as a
separate "offense" under federal mail and wire fraud statutes. 176
Indeed, federal fraud law affords a classic example of how a single
criminal act may engender multiple offenses. 177 However, because
RICO characterizes mail or wire fraud as an "act" rather than as an
"offense," the statute does not contemplate each violation automati-
cally constituting a separate "act" of racketeering. Instead, when
such communications produce but a single injury, they constitute
only a single act of racketeering and ordinarily do not make a
pattern.178
Though the preceding analysis eliminates many potential RICO
cases, it does not itself resolve the question of when multiple crimi-
nal acts constitute a pattern. The Supreme Court, however, pro-
vided insight into this question even before Sedima. In United States
tion. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975) ("The [Organized Crime
Control] Act is a carefully crafted piece of legislation."); 116 CONG. REC. 18,912 (1970)
(statement of Senator McClellan) ("carefully drafted" bill); id at 35,204-05 (statement
of Representative Poff) (in his "experience, no single measure [has] received more thor-
ough consideration by a legislative committee than this bill."). The careful choice of
terminology is reflected by the different meanings given to words such as "means" and
"includes" in the definitions set forth in section 1961. See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 4,
at 241 n.16 (considering difference in terminology); Heivering v. Morgan's, 293 U.S.
121, 125 n.1 (1934) (distinguishing between the legislative use of these terms).
173 See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
174 Cf Blakey & Cessar, supra note 4, at 537 n.37 ("no reason exists when examining
the 'acts' that make up an alleged 'pattern' to focus on a purely jurisdictional 'act,' that is,
a mailing, a use of wire communication, or interstate or foreign transportation").
Though similar analysis has been rejected by a few pre-Sedima decisions, see United
States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F.
Supp. 210, 217 (D. Colo. 1983), these cases failed to consider the difference between the
terms "offense" and "act." Moreover, these decisions were rendered at a time when the
federal courts assumed-without analysis-that two predicate crimes, related either to
each other or to the enterprises, automatically constituted a pattern. See supra notes 44-
45 and accompanying text. Sedima, however, mandates that pattern must be approached
in more analytical terms. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
175 Thus, this analysis provides an important supplement to the Supreme Court's
recent decision holding RICO claims subject to arbitration agreements. Shearson-
American Express v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343-46 (1987).
176 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
177 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); supra note 64 and accompanying text.
178 See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 4, at 537 n.37. S.K. Hand Tool v. Dresser Indus.,
852 F.2d 936, 942-43 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasizing the importance of each act causing
injury and reviewing cases in light of this concept).
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v. Turkette,179 the Court said that "pattern of racketeering activity is
... a series of criminal acts .... "180 RICO's legislative history sup-
ports this view. In considering pattern, Congress stressed only that
the acts must not be "sporadic" or "isolated."18 1 When combined
with the notion of "continuity plus relationship," the concept of pat-
tern as a series of related acts emerges. The use of pattern in Title X
of the Organized Crime Control Act reinforces this analysis.
Though amid suggest otherwise, Sedima properly considered Title X
to be a "useful" reference: " '[C]riminal conduct forms a pattern if
it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or other-
wise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated events.' "182
This description combines relationship and continuity in read-
ily understandable terms.' 8 3 For this reason, it has also been used
to define pattern in many state RICO laws.' 8 4 Though primarily ii-
179 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
180 Id. at 583.
181 See supra notes 8 & 99 and accompanying text. Significantly, Congress did not
use the terms "habitual" or "typical" in connection with "pattern of racketeering
activity."
182 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982)). Amid criticize the
Supreme Court's suggestion on the grounds that RICO is harsher than Title X, and
therefore demands a more stringent pattern requirement. AICPA Brief, supra note 15,
at 24. This argument, however, disregards the statutory structure of the Organized
Crime Control Act. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. Moreover, the legis-
lative record suggests that Congress intended pattern to have similar applications to
both Title IX and Title X. Congress adopted section 3575(e) in response to criticism by
the ABA that Title X, as proposed, failed to define pattern. Organized Crime Control Hear-
ings, supra note 96, at 698 (statement of ABA President Edward L. Wright); 116 CONG.
REC. 35,202 (1970). Congress adopted a description of pattern, proposed by the ABA,
that was drawn from the Senate Report and designed to provide more "specificity." Id.;
see Senate OCCA Report, supra note 24, at 165. Since the description uses the word "if"
and is essentially illustrative, there is no reason to believe it does not apply equally to
Title IX. In contrast, the Dangerous Special Offenders law defined other provisions in
terms of "means" or "includes." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) ("substantial source of income
means"; "special skill or expertise in criminal conduct includes"). Section 3575(e) has
since been repealed and replaced by a comparable provision in the new sentencing
guidelines, 28 U.S.C. § 994(i)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
183 One commentator erroneously suggests that this provision is of limited value in
interpreting pattern under RICO because section 3575(e) deals only with the "relation-
ship" prong of pattern. Black, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)-Secur-
ities and Commercial Fraud as Racketeering Crime after Sedima: What is a "Pattern of
Racketeering Activity"?, 6 PACE L. REv. 365, 383 (1986). However, since section 3575(e)
also requires that the crimes not be "isolated," continuity is addressed as well. Cf
Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1980) (interpreting similar language of
Florida RICO to require continuity).
184 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 772.02 (1986) & § 895.02 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. 16-
14-3 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 18-7803 (1981). In rejecting a vagueness challenge to the
Florida law based on the pattern element, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the
state definition of pattern was derived from federal RICO. Moorehead v. State, 383 So.
2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1980). In doing so, Moorehead cited pre-Sedima federal cases rejecting
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lustrative,18 5 this language clearly contemplates that any series of re-
lated crimes will qualify as a pattern. 186 This view of pattern is
consistent with ordinary usage and other federal jurisprudence. For
example, recently enacted money laundering legislation penalizes
violators engaged in "a pattern of ... illegal activity."' 8 7 Courts
have uniformly held that pattern in this context "consists of re-
peated violations or a series of violations."'' 88 In addition, the King-
pin drug statute uses the term "series" to characterize continuing
activity comparable to RICO. 89 Likewise, various civil rights laws
contain pattern provisions or parallel requirements that may be sat-
isfied by proof of a series of discriminatory acts. 19 0 Finally, under
similar challenges to RICO, and effectively equated pattern in RICO with its embodi-
ment in Title X. Id. See Florida and Federal RICO, supra note 45, at 345 n.l 17 (1987).
Because the states sought to avoid litigation over pattern, they often chose to define this
element specifically, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 772.02 (1986) & § 895.02 (1985); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-14-3 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 18-7803 (1981) (using the term pattern
"means"). Though federal courts have often ignored the difference in terminology be-
tween RICO and state laws, supra note 59, state judges have been truer to the text of
their statutes. For example, Florida's definition of pattern is based on the text of Title
X's description of pattern. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 772.02 (1986) & § 895.02 (1985). The
Florida Supreme Court has applied this language in a straightforward manner to include
both the continuity and relationship prongs of pattern. See Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d
1173, 1174 (Fla. 1981). Bowden observed that the continuity plus relationship standard
serves to confine RICO to professional criminals. Id. Since Florida's statute is derived
from Title X's view of who is a professional criminal, the Court's observation properly
reflects statutory text. In addition, the court's analysis is preferable to the amid ap-
proach which seeks to make professional criminal status the standard for pattern,
thereby reversing the means with the ends of analysis. Thus, after Bowden, the Florida
statute has neither been limited to "organized crime" nor held to exclude "garden vari-
ety fraud." Banderas v. Banco Central del Ecuador, 461 So. 2d 265, 269-70 (Fla. App.
3d Dist. 1985).
185 See supra note 186.
186 See generally United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). The Court, how-
ever, noted that the issue of the applicability of § 3575 was not before it. Id. at 123 n.7.
See also United States v. Kerr, 686 F. Supp. 1187 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
187 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b) (1982).
188 See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 852-53 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987); United States v. Valdes-Guerra, 758 F.2d 1411 (11th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Dickinson, 706 F.2d 88, 91-93 (2d Cir. 1983). See also supra
text accompanying note I (ordinary usage).
189 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2) (1982). The Supreme Court has indicated that "series"
under this law requires the commission of three acts. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S.
773, 774 (1985).
190 For example, in civil rights suits against government entities, courts have rou-
tinely held that a "series of incidents" may provide a basis for inferring the existence of
a "custom or policy" of discrimination. See Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d
1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. California Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788
F.2d 600, 610 (9th Cir. 1986) (may infer pattern from series); Mustfov v. Rice, 663 F.
Supp. 1255, 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (same); Gomez v. City of West Chicago, 506 F. Supp.
1241, 1243, 1245 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (seven incidents provide basis for inference); Diem v.
City of San Francisco, 686 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Similarly, the Supreme Court
has interpreted "pattern or practice" in a variety of civil rights laws to require "more
than the mere occurrence of isolated ... or sporadic discriminatory acts." International
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the law of evidence, series proof is often used to establish a pattern
of conduct.'19 Accordingly, since "series" is an appropriate mecha-
nism for arriving at pattern, "continuity" is satisfied by proof of a
series of predicate "acts." In addition, to meet the "relationship"
aspect of pattern, the acts must be related either to the enterprise or
to each other.192
This interpretation, however, fails to address two situations.
First, RICO clearly contemplates the possibility of two predicates
qualifying as a pattern 93 yet two acts do not make a series. 19 4 The
definition of pattern, therefore, must accommodate the possibility
of a two-predicate pattern. Second, because the preliminary defini-
tion of pattern focuses only on racketeering activity that RICO
treats as an "act,"' 9 5 the definition must also address activity that
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (emphasis added); see also
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986). While the Court has also stated that discrimi-
nation must be "the company's standard operating procedure-the regular rather than
the unusual practice," International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, it has cited with
approval appellate decisions and legislative history interpreting pattern in pragmatic or-
dinary terms. Id. at 336 n.16 (noting intent to give pattern its "usual" meaning rather
than treating it as a "term of art"); see United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451
F.2d 418, 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1023 (1971);
United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Mayton, 335 F.2d 153, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1964). Thus, Congress and the Court
intend "pattern" to be flexibly applied. This flexibility is illustrated by the Supreme
Court's conclusion that merely five incidents may constitute a "continuing pattern" that
extends the limitations provision of such laws. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 380-81 (1982). Moreover, the legislative history to the civil rights laws sug-
gests that, if discrimination is ongoing, a "pattern" exists even if the discrimination is
confined to a branch of a large business. See 110 CONG. REC. 15,895 (1964) (statement
of Representative Celler).
191 See, e.g., Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 206 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Birkenstock, 823 F.2d 1026, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Faulkner, 538
F.2d 724, 728 (6th Cir. 1976).
192 See, e.g., United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1121-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 871 (1980); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 830 n.47 (5th Cir. 1980).
This interpretation of pattern is proper, and is consistent with thejudiciary's rejection of
the common scheme as a prerequisite to pattern. Supra notes 42-43. As an ABA study
group recognized:
Confining the statute's application to those patterns where a direct
relationship existed between each of the predicate offenses would limit
the application of RICO to a single offenses pattern, including a narrow
range of cognate or subservient offenses. For example, it might only be
possible to combine into a single pattern drug offenses and violence or
corruption offenses, where the violence or corruption was used to ad-
vance the drug activity.... [T]his ... would be unwise. Modem criminal
organizations that are, in effect, conglomerates of crime involve a wide
range of offenses; they should not be beyond the reach of the statute.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMMITTEE ON RICO,
MODEL STATE LEGISLATION ON SOPHISTICATED CRIMINAL AcTIvrrY 36-37 (1985).
193 See supra notes 30, 96 & 132 and accompanying text.
194 See supra note 189.
195 See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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RICO characterizes as an "offense" or a "threat." Fortunately, the
same solution resolves both of these needs. Because continuity or its
threat may also be inferred from either the nature of the crime or the
enterprise itself,1 96 these factors must be added to make the defini-
tion of pattern all-inclusive. Thus, pattern means two or more pred-
icates that 1) are related either to each other or to the enterprise;
and 2) constitute a series of acts or otherwise pose a threat of
continuity.
This definition of pattern has many advantages. First, it is
based directly on statutory text and legislative history. Second, it
conforms to other definitions of pattern in federal law. Third, it is
easy to apply. Fourth, it works equally well under each prohibition
imposed by RICO. Finally, properly applied, it provides a way to
curtail RICO's scope without impeding the statute's purpose. 97
CONCLUSION
Justice Cardozo once wrote that "[c]onsequences cannot alter
statutes, but may help to fix their meaning. Statutes must be so con-
strued, if possible, that absurdity and mischief may be avoided."198
If RICO is interpreted accordingly, the multiple scheme test de-
serves to be rejected for its absurdity, and the proposed organized
crime limitation rejected for its mischief.
The enactment of RICO reflected a legislative choice to mount
an aggressive attack on enterprise criminality. Congress intended
that white collar criminals, engaged in a course of enterprise viola-
tions, be subject to RICO liability. The statute's opponents seek to
avoid this result through an ideological assault designed to con-
strain the pattern element. If RICO is to have an ideology, however,
it must be that all who engage in enterprise criminality are subject to
sanction.' 99 The pattern element, when properly understood, can
facilitate this goal without improperly expanding RICO's reach.
Given the lower courts' failure to implement this legislative design,
the responsibility to do so now falls upon the Supreme Court.
196 See supra notes 1, 73, 93 & 97 and accompanying text. Properly applied, these
factors would not convert an ordinary business dispute, supra note 66, into a RICO
claim. Cf. supra note 69 and accompanying text.
197 Cf supra notes 73, 93, 163 & 165 and accompanying text. The proposed defini-
tion also works well with respect to the procedural consequences of pattern. See supra
note 4.
198 Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 91, 116 N.E. 782, 785 (1917).
199 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. Cf United States v. Carter, 493
F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1974) ("We all stand equal before the bar of criminal justice, and
the wearing of a white collar ... does not preclude the organized pursuit of unlawful
profit.").
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